# Policy Concerns in an Era of Low Fertility:

# Social Comparisons and Intensive Parenting


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
#### Motivation

- Global fertility rate at record low.
- Much discussion among policy-makers.
- We propose a new reason for low birth rates: comparison motives.
- Novel policy insights.

# Recent Fertility Decline in the United States



#### Not All Countries Are Declining!



Very heterogeneous paths among high-income countries.

#### A Novel Explanation: Social Comparison Motives

- People care about relative status (Veblen 1899).
- Catching-up-with-the-Joneses large literature in macro.
- We believe status concerns are also relevant when it comes to children:
   Parents compare educational outcomes of their children to those of other people's children.
  - → Tilts the Q-Q trade-off towards quality.
  - → Makes children expensive.
  - → Depresses the birth rate.

#### Outline

- 1. Formalize the idea
- 2. Evidence
- 3. Policy implications

### A Simple Model

Parents choose fertility *n* and how much time to invest in each child *x*.

Comparison motive: Parents care about child human capital relative to  $\tilde{h}$ .

$$\max_{c,n,x} \left[ \ln c + \omega_n \ln n + \omega_h \ln \left( h - \chi \tilde{h} \right) \right]$$
s.t.  $c = (1 - \lambda n - xn)z$ 

$$h = h_0 + x$$

Benchmark human capital level  $\tilde{h}$  is determined in equilibrium by the choices of all other parents.

 $\chi$  governs the strength of the comparison motive.

Suppose countries differ in  $\chi$ .

#### **Model Results**

**Result 1 (cross-country):** Countries/regions with a stronger comparison motive (larger  $\chi$ ), invest more (higher x), and have lower fertility, n.

#### Extended Model & Additional Results

- Add heterogeneity (high and low productivity parents).
- Add parental monetary investments.
- Upward comparison motives.
- Consider productivity changes over time z<sub>t</sub>.

**Result 2 (changes over time):** If  $z_t$  grows over time, fertility falls. The fall is larger, the stronger the comparison motive  $(\chi)$ .


**Result 3 (spillovers):** With upward comparison motives, fertility declines even for groups that experience no income growth.

# **Empirical Evidence**

### Cross-Country Evidence (Result 1)

Model predicts negative relationship btw comparison motives & fertility.

First proxy "education worries" from WVS.



## Cross-Country Evidence: Changes over Time (Result 2)


Model predicts a larger TFR fall over time (as incomes increase) in countries with more education worries.

Log TFR Change
-0.205**
(0.0817)
yes
20
0.450

<sup>\*\*</sup> p < 0.05

Controls: GDP per capita, population, unemployment rate.


#### Comparison Motives and Fertility Paths



Singapore, Chile and Korea have strong comparison motives.

#### Evidence from U.S. Counties: Social Media (Result 1)

- Economic Connectedness (EC): share of above-median SES friends among below-median SES individuals on Facebook.
- → Model predicts that higher EC counties should have lower birth rates.



#### U.S. States: College Competitiveness (Result 1)

- Comparison motives might be partly driven by college competition.
- → Model predicts that states with more college competition have fewer births.

	Birth Rate 2007
Competitiveness Index	-12.26***
Bound et al. (2009)	(2.302)
Observations	51
R <sup>2</sup>	0.200

Controls: State GDP, Population, Employment.

• A state at the 75th percentile of college competitiveness (1.045) has 3.5 births less per 1,000 women (aged 15-44) than a state at the 25th percentile (0.76).

<sup>\*</sup> p < 0.05, \*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.001.

#### **Fertility Policy**

- Switch in policy stance:
  - 20th century: birth control policies common in many countries.
  - By now, more than 30% of countries try to encourage births.
- Should governments try to curb or stimulate fertility?
- Answering this question requires understanding the reasons behind low fertility rates.

#### **Comparison Motives Justify Govt Intervention**

- Comparison motives pose an externality.
  - → leads to inefficiently high education investments.
  - → equilibrium fertility inefficiently low.
- First-best can be implemented by a combination of pro-natal transfers financed through taxes on education.

### Will Reducing Parental Investments be Bad for the Kids?

- Not necessarily!
- Some investments are arguably socially wasteful (SAT prep courses?).
- Some even harmful (excessive study times → myopia ↑, obesity ↑, child mental health ↓).
- We build a model of college admission where banning test preparation is welfare improving and does not lower child HK.

#### **Novel Policy Implications**

- Tax or regulate private education institutions.
  - → Examples from other countries:
    - China's "Double Reduction Policy" includes ban of private for-profit after-school tutoring.
    - Curfews on *hagwons* in Korea.
    - UK abandoned VAT tax exemption on private schools in 2025.
  - → Recent changes in U.S. 529 plans went in opposite direction.
- Weaken people's ability to act on comparison motives:
  - Reduce high stake exams.
  - Communicate precise rank information cautiously (e.g. Korea recently replaced exact scores with a 5-tier scale for college entrance exam).
  - Communities should be careful in publishing school rankings.
- Social media regulation? (Role of Momfluencers?)

#### **Summary**

- Comparison motive as novel reason for low fertility.
- Evidence that
  - 1. comparison motives and birth rates are negatively related (Result 1).
  - 2. fertility declines more pronounced in countries with strong comparison motives (Result 2).
- Novel policy implications